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This article summarizes many of the criminal law decisions decided by the United States Supreme Court during
the last two terms.

SEARCH & SEIZURE
Pretextual Searches
In Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a "pretextual" traffic stop. A unanimous Court held that the temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause that he violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped
f the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective.
While patrolling a "high drug" area, plainclothes police
observed a truck at a stoplight. It paused longer than necessary, turned abruptly without a signal, and sped off at an
unreasonable rate of speed. Traffic stops were not part of
these plainclothes policemen's duties. Upon approaching
the vehicle to supposedly warn the driver of possible traffic
violations, they saw bags of crack cocaine in the defendants' hands.
Whren argued that the Fourth Amendment test in this
context should be whether a reasonable officer would have
stopped the car for the purpose of enforcing a traffic violation. Whren contended that the police otherwise would be
encouraged to use common traffic violations as a means to
investigate different crimes. The Court said its precedents
made clear that ulterior motives do not invalidate police conduct that was justified by probable cause. United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Subjective intent does not
matter. The Court also rejected Whren's theory that police
conduct should be judged for its reasonableness according
to local law enforcement practices. This would mean the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment would change "from
place to place and from time to time:·
Finally, Whren argued .that a "balancing of interests"

1

i

Jj/_1(}(/'

under the Fourth Amendment would not support inconveniencing motorist by stops from plainclothes police in unmarked cars. He argued that such a practice would inconvenience, confuse, and provoke anxiety in motorists, while
only minimally advancing a government interest in traffic
safety. The Court found this contention unpersuasive. A
"balancing of interests" inquiry is used only for searches and
seizures conducted in some extraordinary manner and
which unusually invaded privacy or physical interests- for
example, seizures by deadly force, unannounced entries
into the home, or physical penetrations of the body. Traffic
stops by plainclothes police do not fit this category.

Appellate Review
In Ornelas v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996), the
Supreme Court held that decisions concerning "reasonable
suspicion" to stop motorists and "probable cause" for a subsequent vehicle search should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Each inquiry raises two different issues: The first involves a determination of the historical facts that lead up to
the stop (or search). The second issue involves a mixed
question of law and fact: whether, from the perspective of
an objectively reasonable police officer, reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed. Allowing appellate courts to
independently review the second inquiry is consistent with
earlier decisions of the Court - for example, Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). It also prevents varied
results stemming from conflicting interpretations of similar
facts by different trial judges. Moreover, de novo review is
necessary for appellate courts to clarify and maintain control over legal issues. Lastly, it should unify precedent and
provide the police with a defined set of rules.
The Court, however, also noted that reviewing courts
should review historical facts only for clear error. Additionally, "due weighf' should be given to the determinations of
the trial judge. This means taking into account the distinctive traits and events of a locale and the experiences that
color the perception and judgment of police officers.
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Knock & Announce Rule
In Wiison v. Arkansas, 115 S.Ct. 1914 (1995), Justice
Thomas, for a unanimous Court, wrote that the common law
rule of "knock and-announce" is part of the Fourth
Amendment:
Our own cases have acknowledged that the common
law principle of announcement is "embedded in Anglo
American law," but we have never squarely held that
this principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. We now do so.
Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of
the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the
method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among
the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. ld. at 1918.
The Court indicated that exceptions to the rule must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

of different treatment of similarly situated persons." ld. at
1489. This threshold must establish both a prosecutorial ir
tent to discriminate and a discriminatory effect. See Oyler
Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
Armstrong argued that Federal Criminal Rule 16, which
provides for defense discovery of certain documents, supported the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court diE
agreed, ruling that discovery under Rule (a)(1 )(C) is limiteo
to documents related to the prosecution's case-in-chief.

JURY TRIAL
Petty Offoense Exception
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 {1968), decided that the right to a jury trial does
not apply to petty offenses. More recently, the Court in
Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 {1989), held that
the best indicator of the seriousness of a crime is the lengtl
of the legislatively determined prison time for the offense. 1
maximum s'en~ence longer than six months indicates that
the legislature considered the crime to be serious. A sentence of six months or less is considered a petty offense,
unless the legislature has authorized additional statutory
penalties so severe as to indicate that it considered the offense serious. ·
Lewis v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2163 (1996), involved
multiple crimes whose aggregate punishment exceeded th1
six-month !imit~ but vvhen taken individually did not. The de
fendant was a mail carrier charged with two counts of obstructing the mail. Each offense carried a maximum jail tim
of six months. The magistrate ordered a bench trial, commenting that she would not impose a sentence of more tha
six months imprisonment.
The Supreme Court held that because the legislature se
the prison term at six months, it considered the offense
petty. Adding two offenses together to exceed the six-mont
limit does not change t)le legislative intent, the guiding prin·
ciple in the analysis. Because the majority believed that thi
analysis answered the question, it did not determine
whether a judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing
changes the right to a jury trial.

School Drug Searches
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386
{1995), the Supreme Court upheld random urinanalysis
drug testing for public high school students who participated
in athletic programs. Based on prior cases upholding drug
testing in other contexts, the Court found the drug testing
scheme at issue reasonable. "Fourth Amendment rights, no
less than First and Fourteenth Amendment, are different in
public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry
cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children." ld. at 2392. See also Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1 989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Assn, 489 U.S. 602 (1 989).
Erroneous Radio Reports
In Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 {1995), the Supreme
Court decided that the exclusionary rule~s purpose to deter
illegal police conduct would not be served where an officer
arrests someone following a radio report of an outstanding
warrant, when in fact the warrant had been quashed. Since
the error was made, not by police, but by court employees,
the Supreme Court held that there was no sound reason to
apply the exclusionary rule.
[T]here is no basis for believing that application of the
exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a
significant effect on court employees responsible for
informing the police that a warrant has been quashed.
Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, they have no stake in
the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. ld. at
1193.

Mixed Questions of Fact & Law
In United States v. Gaudin, 115 S.Ct. 2310 (1995), the
defendant was convicted of making false statements on
loan applications submitted to the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). To convict, the prosecutio1
had to prove that the false statements were material to
HUD's decisions. The trial court held that such a determine:
tion was for the court, rather than the jury. The Supreme
Court reversed, finding Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations.
The government conceded that materiality is an element
of the offense but suggested that the jury's responsibility to
decide the essential elements of a crime is limited to factua
components. The Court held that the decisions cited by thE
government, beginning with Sparf & Hansen v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), stand for the proposition that
juries have always been required to decide mixed question~
of law and fact, not simply facts. Indeed, the jury is
responsible for the "delicate assessments of the inferences
a 'reasonable [decisionmaker]' would draw from a given set
of facts and the significance of the inferences to him:' TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1 976).

SELECTIVE PROSECUTIONS
Many studies and commentators have suggested the
possibility that African-Americans are selectively prosecuted
for drug offenses, most notably for crack cocaine. Defendants seeking to assert a selective prosecution claim will receive little encouragement from United States v. Armstrong,
116 S.Ct. 1480 {1996). An en bane Ninth Circuit decided
that a claim of selective prosecution by African-American
defendants required that the prosecution either submit to
discovery requests or drop the charges. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a defendant who seeks discovery for a claim of selective prosecution based upon race
must meet a threshold requirement- "a credible showing
2

INTOXICATION DEFENSE
In Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. 2013 (1996), the
Supreme Court ruled that a state statute that precluded an
accused's use of intoxication to negate a required mens rea
,..~. did not violate due process. There was, however, no majori1 £. ty opinion. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia,
noted that the primary due process guide "in determining
whether the principle in question is fundamental is, of
course, historical practice: The common law did not initially
recognize intoxication as a defense. Hall, Intoxication and
Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv L Rev 1045 (1944). "Eventually, however, the new view won out, and by the end of the
19th century, in most American jurisdictions, intoxication
could be considered in determining whether a defendant
was capable of forming the specific intent necessary to
commit the crime charged.' The plurality considered this delayed acceptance of the intoxication defense as evidence
that the defense was not fundamental to our jurisprudence.
In addition, one-fifth of the states either have never accepted the "new rule" or have recently abandoned it. Moreover,
the plurality believed there was a justification for abolishing
the defense. "A large number of crimes, especially violent
crimes, are committed by intoxicated offenders; modern
studies put the numbers as high as half of all homicides, for
example."
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion provided the critical fifth vote. She did not view the case as a burden of
proof or evidentiary case. She concluded that the statute
redefined the mens rea requirement, a substantive criminal
issue that had traditionally been left to the states. The dissenters disagreed only to the extent that Justice Ginsburg's
reading of the statute was precluded by the interpretation of
I the Washington Supreme Court. In the dissenter's view,
once a state defined a crime to include a mens rea element,
the state could not prevent the defendant, without a substantial justification, from introducing evidence to negate
that element. Even under this view, a state is not precluded
from defining a crime in such a way that it abolished intoxication as a defense.

statute to eliminate" any constitutional doubt "so long as
such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress." ld. at 472. Lack of a scienter requirement for
the age of the performers would have raised constitutional
doubts. The Court's interpretation is supported by the tradition that a statute is to be construed where possible to avoid
substantial constitutional questions. Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and Staples v. United States,
114 S.Ct.1793 (1994), had held that"the presumption in
favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the
statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct:' 115 Ct. at 469.
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Due process requires that a defendant be mentally competent during trial. The test is whether the accused has the
mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings
and to assist counsel. Forty-six states require an accused
to satisfy a preponderance-of-evidence standard when asserting a lack of mental competence to stand trial. In
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (1996), the state argued that its clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, a
higher standard of proof, did not violate the Due Process
Clause. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because it would permit a defendant who is "more likely than
not" incompetent to stand trial.
The Court declined to accept Oklahoma's argument that
such a standard of proof vvas necessaiy to insure prornpt
and orderly disposition of meritless cases. According to the
Court, the defendant's right to a fair trial is more important
than the state's interest in efficient operation of its criminal
justice system. The Court was able to reconcile this decision with its opinion in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979), which held that due process requires a clear and
convincing standard of proof in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. Such proceedings, according to the
Court, address entirely different substantive issues. In that
case, the individual's fundamental right to liberty is protected. Here, due process protects the fundamental right not to
stand trial while incompetent. Additionally, Addington did
not purport to set standards for criminal proceedings.

DUE PROCESS & MENS REA
The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act of 1977, 18 U.S. C.§ 2252(a), forbids knowingly transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. In United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S.Ct. 464
(1994), the issue turned on whether the word "knowingly''
modified other parts of the statute and not merely the surrounding verbs. The Ninth Circuit held that the statute did
not require that a defendant know that a performer was a
minor and ruled the statute unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court reversed. The majority concluded
that a scienter element is properly read into the statute, so
that knowledge of a performer's minority is required for
conviction. In the Court's view, to hold otherwise would
entail ridiculous results unintended by Congress. If the
statute had no knowledge requirement for minority status of
the actors, then "a retail druggist who returns an uninspected roll of developed film to a customer 'knowingly distrib/ utes' a visual depiction and would be criminally liable if it
were later discovered that the visual depiction contained
images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct." ld.
at 467.
Significantly, the Court believed it necessary to "read the

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Forfeiture
In United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996), the defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents
the government from punishing a defendant for a criminal
offense and then forfeiting his property for that same offense
in a separate proceeding. In this case, the government
began forfeiture proceedings against property used to produce marijuana and then began a criminal prosecution. A
companion case, consolidated by the Court, involved a forfeiture proceeding for property used in money laundering
and proceeds from a felonious drug transaction. The forfeiture proceeding was deferred, while the defendants were
prosecuted for money laundering and drug charges.
The Supreme Court decided that in rem civil forfeitures
are neither punishment nor criminal for double jeopardy purposes. The lower courts had relied mainly on United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), and Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602 (1993). According to the majority, the lower
courts misinterpreted these cases, which did not replace the
traditional analysis for determining whether a civil sanction
constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The
3
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proper analysis includes a two-part test that asks, first,
whether Congress intended a particular forfeiture to be a remedial civil sanction or a criminal penalty. The second part
asks whether the forfeiture proceedings are so punitive in
nature that they cannot legitimately be categorized as civil
proceedings, despite a congressional intent to establish a
civil remedy. This two-part test is long established and most
recently upheld in United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1 984).
These precedents establish that "[i]n rem civil forfeiture is
a remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in
personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not constitute a punishment for double jeopardy purposes." 116 S.Ct.
at 2137. In the Court's view, there is no doubt that Congress intended this type of ·proceeding to be civil in nature.
The statute's enforcement mechanisms are civil, and there
is insufficient evidence (must be the "clearest proof")
suggesting that the statutes were so punitive as to render
them criminal despite a contrary congressional intent. The
Court found other reasons to support its position: (1) in rem
civil forfeitures have not historically been regarded as punishment; (2) there is no requirement in the statutes that the
government demonstrate scienter to establish that the
property is forfeitable; (3) although the statutes may have a
deterrent purpose, this purpose may serve civil as well as
criminal goals; and (4) the fact that the statutes are tied to
criminal activity is insufficient in itself to render them
punitive.

pie punishments when a potential collateral consequence,
e.g., delay of parole eligibility or an increased sentence
under a recidivist statute for a future offense, exist.
Rutledge's conviction for conspiring to distribute cocainE
was a lesser included offense of his conviction for a continr
ing criminal enterprise. Under Blockburger v. United State:
284 U.S. 299 {1 932), there are two offenses if each statute
requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The goverr
ment contended that even if the conspiracy was a lesser i~
eluded offense, the presumption against multiple punishments was not violated because the concurrent sentence
did not amount to punishment at all. The Court rejected th
argument under Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 {1 985),
which held that "the collateral consequences of a second
conviction make it as presumptively impermissible to impose as it would be to impose any other unauthorized cumulative sentence." 116 S.Ct. at 1248. The imposition of a
fifty dollar assessment for the second conviction was a sufi
cient collateral consequence.

BRADY RULE
In Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555 {1 995), the Supreme
Court reversed a first degree murder conviction due to a
Brady violation. While the victim loaded grocery bags into
her car, a gunman shot her and took the car. The police ot
tained statements from six eyewitnesses. These witnesse~
differed significantly in their descriptions of the height, age,
weiaht, and hair lenath of the assailant. An informant subsequently contacted-the police, revealing that he might hav
bought the victim's car from Kyles. The informant expressE
concern that he would be a suspect, and several of his
statements were inconsistent. The police found the murde1
weapon in Kyles's apartment and the victim's purse in the
apartment complex's garbage, both where the informant
said they would be. Neither the victim's nor Kyles's fingerprints were found on the purse or the car, and the police
never checked for the informant's fingerprints. In a photographic lineup, three of the six eyewitnesses picked out
Kyles, two were not sure, and one was not shown the photographs.
When the defense requested all exculpatory evidence,
the prosecution replied that there was none. The defense
was never informed of the six contemporaneous eyewitnes
statements, several of the informant's tape and recorded
statements, license numbers of cars near the scene (none
of which matched Kyles's car license), an internal police
memorandum indicating that the informant had suggested
that the police check the rubbish for the purse, and evidence linking the informant to other crimes at the same
store and to an earlier murder. The prosecution's case depended on the identifications of four of the eyewitnesses.
The defense offered an alibi and asserted that the informar
had "framed" Kyles. The jury deadlocked and a mistrial wa:
declared. After the mistrial, the prosecutor interviewed the
informant and additional material inconsistencies developed. At the retrial, the prosecution once again offered eye
witnesses and photographs of the scene that they argued
showed Kyles's car. Several defense witnesses testified thi
the informant, not Kyles, had been in the stolen car after th'
murder and that the informant had been near the location i1
Kyles's apartment where the weapon was subsequently
found by the police. Kyles was convicted and sentenced to
death.
On review, the Supreme Court addressed the Brady
issue. In United States v Bagley, 473 US 667 (1 985), ''the

Double Punishment
In Witte v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2199 (1 995), the
Supreme Court ruled that use of uncharged cocaine offenses for the purpose of imposing a higher sentence (within the
statutorily authorized range for a related marijuana charge)
did not preclude the subsequent prosecution of the cocaine
charges.
Witte plead guilty to federal marijuana charges, in which
the sentencing court took into account as "relevant conduct"
under the sentencing guidelines the defendant's prior involvement in an uncharged cocaine conspiracy. Witte was
later indicted on the cocaine charges and moved for dismissal, arguing that he was being punished twice for the
same offense. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, ruling that Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), had
held that use of relevant conduct to increase punishment for
a charged offense does not "punish" the offender for the relevant conduct.
The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that "petitioner's double jeopardy theory- that consideration of uncharged conduct in arriving at a sentence within the statutorily authorized punishment range constitutes 'punishment' for that
conduct - is not support by our precedents, which make
clear that a defendant in that situation is punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the defendant is convicted." 116 S.Ct at 2205. The Court held that
Williams governed, regardless of whether the punishment
enhancement occurs in the first or second proceeding.
Double Punishment
In Rutledge v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1241 (1 996), the
Supreme Court unanimously held that when two statutory
provisions proscribe the same offense, it is presumed that
the legislature did not intend to impose two punishments.
The test is whether each of the statutory provisions requires
proof of a fact which the other does not. Further, concurrent
convictions do not invalidate the presumption against multi-
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Court disavowed any difference between exculpatory and
impeachment evidence for Brady purposes, and it abandoned the distinction between the second and third AgUrs
circumstances, i.e., the 'specific-request' and 'general- or
no-request' situations." l.d. at 15?5. ~he Court al~o com- .
1
· mented: 'The prosecution's aff1rmat1ve duty to d1sclose evidence favorable to a defendant can trace its origins to early
20th-century strictures against misrepresentation and is of
course most prominently associated with this Court's decision in Brady . ..." ld. at 1565.
The Court went on to explain that Bagley had addressed
four aspects of the "materiality" requirement. First, that
requirement did not mean that the defendant had to show
that the undisclosed evidence would have resulted in an
acquittal.
"Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a 'reasonable
probability' of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence
he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting
in a verdict worthy of confidence. A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when
the Government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' ld. at
1566 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
Second, the Bagley materiality requirement is "not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate
that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the
undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough
left to convict." Third, once a reviewing court has found conf stitutional error ''there is no need for further harmless-error
review." ld. at 1566. Fourth, the materiality standard focuses
on the "suppressed evidence considered collectively, not
item-by-item." ld. at 1567.
"On the one side, showing that the prosecution knew of
an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does
not amount to a Brady violation, without more. But the prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be
assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely
net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when
the point of 'reasonable probability' is reached. This in turn
means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police:' ld. at
1567. If in doubt, the prosecutor should disclose: 'This
means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking
too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence .... This is as it should be." ld. at 1568. See Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (the prosecutor's interest "in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done").
In Kyles, the suppressed evidence "collectively" would
have made a different result probable. The prosecution's
eyewitness case would have been substantially weakened if
the witnesses' prior statements had been revealed. One
witness's crime scene description differed markedly from
Kyles's height and weight; it was much closer to the infer/ mant's size. A second witness's statement would have "fueled a withering cross-examination, destroying confidence
in Smallwood's story and raising a substantial implication
that the prosecutor had coached him to give it." ld. at 1570.
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that these
were the State's two best witnesses. In addition, the infer-

mant's inconsistent statements would have "revealed a remarkably uncritical attitude on the part of the police:' ld. at
1571.
Polygraph Results
In Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S.Ct. 7 (i 995), the Supreme Court ruled that a lower court was wrong in concluding that the prosecution's failure to turn over the results of
polygraph examinations of key witnesses violated Brady.
The defendant admitted participation in a robbery, in which
a person was shot and killed. The issue was whether the
killing was premeditated murder or a lesser form of murder.
The defendant claimed that the weapon fired accidently.
Two prosecution witnesses, the defendant's brother and the
brother's girlfriend, took polygraph examinations prior to
trial. Their answers were consistent with their subsequent
trial testimony. When asked about their own involvement in
the robbery, the examiner found her answers to be "inconclusive" and the brother's to be "deceptive." Neither examination was disclosed to the defense.
The Court ruled that Brady had not been violated. Polygraph results were inadmissible under state law, even for
impeachment, in the absence of a stipulation. "Disclosure
of the polygraph results, then, could have had no direct effect on the outcome of trial, because respondent could have
made no mention of them either during argument or while
questioning witnesses." Id. at 10. The possibility that the
undisclosed information would have led the defense counsel
to additional avenues of discovery was, in the Court's view,
speculative. Moreover, at the habeas proceeding the trial
defense counsel testified that he had made a strategic decision to limit the cross-examination of the brother.
Accordingly, "it is not 'reasonably likely' that disclosure of the
polygraph results - inadmissible under state law- would
have resulted in a different outcome at trial." ld. at 11.

r£

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
In Purkett v. Elem, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995), the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether a race neutral explanation for a peremptory juror strike need be persuasive
or even plausible. The prosecutor had used his peremptory
strikes to dismiss two African-American jurors. He did so
because they had long, unkempt hair with mustaches and
goatees. "And I don't like the way they looked, with the way
the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the
beards look suspicious to me." 115 S.Ct. at 1770.
The Eighth Circuit ruled that ''the prosecution must at
least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for believing that those factors will somehow affect the person'~
ability to perform his or her duties as a juror'' when striking a
juror, who is the same race as the defendant. 25 F.3d at
683.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower
court had misconstrued Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). In Batson, the Court had said that the proponent of
the strike must give a "clear and reasonably specific explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981 ))
The Supreme Court explained that this requirement does
not mean that the reason has to make sense, only that it
does not deny equal protection. Batson sets forth a threestep process. First, the opponent must make out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. Then, the burden shifts
to the proponent of the strike to articulate a race-neutral

5
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reason for the strike. Finally, if a race-neutral explanation is
given, the trial court has to decide if the proponent has
shown purposeful racial discrimination. According to the
Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit mistakenly believed that
the second step required a reason that was persuasive, or
even plausible. Quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 360 (1991 ), the Court reiterated that "[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation,
the reason offered will be deemed race neutral:' The ultimate burden of persuasion to prove racial discrimination
never shifts from the opponent of the strike.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a lengthy
dissent, pointing out that Batson requires that the second
step include an explanation that "relate[s] to the particular
case to be tried." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. This interpretation
serves to avoid pretextual reasons that disguise racially discriminatory intent. The dissent recharacterized the threestep process of Batson. "First, a pattern of peremptory challenges of black jurors may establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory purpose. Second, the prosecutor may rebut
that prima face case by tendering a race neutral explanation
for the strikes. Third, the court must decide whether that explanation is pretextual." Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1772. For the
dissent, Batson is meaningless unless the proponent of the
strike rebuts the prima facie showing of discrimination with a
"race neutral, reasonably specific, and trial related" explanation. ld. at 1774.

'li;;· ..
h."·'

parole board would not have to hold another hearing in the
year or two after the initial hearing. The Court emphasizec
that it has long refused to articulate any particular formula
for measuring when legislative adjustments are of sufficien
"moment'' to transgress the Ex Post Facto Clause. This
case aroused no need for such articulation because the
amended statute's chance for increasing punishment was
far too "speculative and attenuated."
HABEAS CORPUS
The Supreme Court in Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S.Ct.
457 (1995), addressed the question of whether state court
"in custody'' rulings, which determine whether Miranda
warnings are due, qualify for a presumption of correctness
under 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d). The Ninth Circuit had affirmed
denial of a habeas petition on the grounds that the issue
raised a factual issue. Consequently, the presumption of
correctness applied.
The Supreme Court, however, held that determining
whether a suspect is "in custody'' is a mixed question of lav
and fact; a question which state trial courts are in no better
position than federal courts to answer. In prior cases, the
Court has held that factual issues for section 2254(d) purposes are those which are "basic, primary, or historical
facts." Miller v. Fenton, 47 4 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). In certai'
instances, factual issues extend beyond what are considered the ''what happened" facts. These might include competency to stand trial or juror impartiality - issues judged
according to witness credibility and demeanor. These issues are more properly resolved by the trial court. In contrast, other issues, such as the voluntariness of a confession or the effectiveness of counsel's assistance, should be
considered questions of law in this context.
Under this last line of cases, there are ''what happened"
issues that warrant the presumption of correctness and
there are questions on the "ultimate question" which are ou
side of the statutory presumption. This has to do with the
"uniquely legal dimension" of the "ultimate question." Miller
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985). For example, in the
cases such as the one at hand, there is a difference between the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession and whether a reasonable person would have felt
that he or she was not at liberty to end the interrogation an
leave. The Court held that the determination is one of
mixed law and fact, placing it outside the statutory presum~
tion.

EX POST FACTO
The Supreme Court in California Dept. of Corrections v.
Morales, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (1995), decided that a statute that
changed parole hearing procedures after a defendant's conviction (thus arguably increasing the sentence imposed) did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The California statute
in question was amended after Morales' conviction to allow
parole boards to defer suitability hearings for three years.
Previously, prisoners were allowed annual hearings.
Morales argued that such a law makes parole less accessible, thus making his sentence longer in violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held that the
statute did nothing to effect Morales's indeterminate sentence (15 years to life), and it did not alter the "substantive
formula for securing any reductions to the sentencing
range:' ld. at 1598. The statutory amendment simply altered the method for fixing a parole release date so that the
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